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The role of central planning in Polish agriculture has always been
different from the one  in the non-agricultural sectors of the national
economy.  The main reason is  the dominance of privately owned land.  Private
farming contributes around 80 percent of total agricultural output.  Self-
financing and autonomous in the decision-making process in individual farms
have made the difference.  Given these circumstances the central planning
process in agriculture couldn't be identified as a very direct steering of
production in the private farms.  However, this  is true  in the non-
agricultural sectors of national economy where the production goals  and the
production resources would be allocated to the firms  through the central
plan.  In non-agricultural  sectors of national economy, the central planning
has often been identified with the central management of the state owned
firms.  The Central Planner has conducted almost the same role as  executive
directors in a typical Western company in these cases.
The market economy parameters like prices, profit, and interest rates
have played very passive regulative roles.  The Central Planner and policy-
making people have been convinced that they are  able to  control these
parameters in order to achieve objectives of the central plan.  This has been
the way the State has control over production and the agricultural market.
Through the decades of administrative allocation of production objectives and
resources,  the Central Planner has grown accustomed to  the situation where the2
direct determination of prices is an absolute attribute of the socialist
state 1 This job  is too difficult to be done properly while  ignoring markets
which would serve verification of those decisions.  In fact, the mistakes made
in price regulation have been accumulated creating distortions in the
performance of the whole economy.  The Central Planner could not create
economic parameters as effective  as market could, especially it is true  for
the industrial sectors.  It  is  not possible to handle the  amount of
information needed to  control and monitor the economic performance of each
firm.
As  far as  the private farming of Polish agriculture is  concerned, the
central planning system has not meant the central management of each farm.
Market has played more active role  in allocating resources.  Market here has
been important sources  to provide the objective economic parameters like
prices.  However, the central planner has controlled economic parameters which
have played active roles in the decision-making process of independent farms.
The objectives and assumptions  of the central plan have played the leading
roles  in creating the real conditions of the  input supply market and farm
output market.  In this paper we attempt to investigate  the changing role of
central planning  in the private sector of Polish agriculture in recent years,
especially after the implementation of the  market oriented economic reform.
The  role and functions of central planning toward this sector of agriculture
have been unique among centrally planned economies.
As has already been mentioned, a dominant role in Polish agriculture  is
played by the private farming.  These farms have always been independent.  The
free marketing of their products has been allowed most of the time.  The3
restrictions have been only related to  the limited accessibility to  means  of
production.  The purchase of farm inputs  and equipment has been related with
the output sale.  Farmers couldn't obtain some supply of inputs, for  instance,
coal  and some types of mineral fertilizers, unless they  sold to  the state-
owned market institution certain farm products at the purchasing prices set by
the government.  The similar constraints have been imposed by the contracting
system.  These two cases were treated as  direct administrative methods of
central plan implementation.  However, it would not be appropriate to call
them as government direct interventions in the production development of
agriculture.  A list of direct administrative involvements in economic
performance of private farming sector can be presented here.
2 For instance,
these  include interest rate and the strict regulation of farm credit.  There
have also been some hidden restrictions in farm land trading and ownerships.
These have been related to the changing goals of current economic policies  and
the changing plans to expand the socialized sector further  in agriculture.
These government involvements  can be regarded as  direct methods of
implementation of the objectives of Central Plan.  Beside these the central
planner almost directly conditioned production and economic environment
affecting economic performance of private agriculture.  Most agricultural
products have been purchased and processed by the state and cooperative owned
enterprises.  These firms, most of them monopolistic nature, have been
governed in a directed-order system.  They had to meet the planned targets
transmitted to them directly as a commend from the planner.  These
enterprises, especially procurement organizations, however, have not been able
to  transmit these planned targets  to  the private  farms  in the  same way.  They
have had to act in a different way from the agents  in the rest of the national4
economy.  They have faced independent and self-financing private farms.  Free
market of farm products  also existed with free prices.  These had impacts on
the way central plan targets have been executed in the private farming sector
of Polish agriculture.  Under these conditions procurement prices have been
influenced by supply-demand rules.  The procurement prices couldn't only
reflect the  intention to meet the  targets of central plan.  In practice,
however, the central bureaucracy implemented the farm price policy ignoring
market forces  and deteriorating the  operating environment of the private
farmers.  Besides  the price policy, the fiscal policy toward private farmers
has been a subject  of central administrative regulation.
Through the control and formulation of farm output prices and the direct
control over procurement organization, food processing firms and food
retailers,  the central planner has had an influence on decision-making process
of private farming.  The  demand for food and other commodities has been
conditioned by those channels.  The central planner has controlled although
not so effectively the  level of wages and salaries as well as  the rate of
employment.  The majority of national  labor force  (about 70 percent of total
employment) is employed by the state-owned firms or state-controlled
(cooperative firm for instance) firms,  organizations and institutions.  The
Central Planner  in fact has created out of agriculture job opportunities by
controlling investments.  It  is  the central planner's decision to  oversee
national  income related with savings/investments and consumption.
Almost the  same situation as  described above, was observed on the  side of
the  supply market.  The  Central Planner easily transmitted the planned targets
to  the state monopolistic producers of means of production and inputs for
farming.  The  level and structure of production as well as  the prices for  farm5
inputs have been directly determined by the Central Planner following the
central plan targets and goals of economic policy.  The  shares of private
business  in farm input production, the impact of equipment and current inputs
for farming were not substantial to play any role under the price regulation
upon this market.  The formulation of prices by the central planner for farm
supply materials has been based on cost of production of monopolistic
manufacturers.  In order to hold the cost of agricultural production low, the
prices of some critical inputs  like mineral fertilizers have been subsidized.
Hence, most of the prices were subject to administrative regulations resulting
in the deterioration of the operating environment for private farmers.
However, this was considered as a way of transmission of planned targets  to
private farming.
In conclusion, the Central Planner controlled the operating environment
of private agriculture prior to the economic reform.  The Central Planner was
able to provide any amounts of means of production or the incentives  to meet
the planned targets.  This was a part of the central plan for  the national
economy.  The composition of planned targets was based upon a kind of
consensus  among interest groups representing different sectors  of economy.
The Agricultural lobby has usually not been so  influential to  the Central
Planner's decision to  improve the operating environment for private  farming
sector.  The needs in the production of this sector of agriculture have been
considered last  in the list of planning procedure, since the priority has been
given to  the industrial development.  Also the presence of private agriculture
in a socialist country had always been an open question for discussion.  Only
in 1982 the Civil  Code was revised to read that  "the Polish People's Republic
guarantees  the ownership and full protection of private agriculture, which6
represents a permanent and equal component of socio-economic structure  of
Polish People's Republic".  In this  system of central planning, the government
also has taken the responsibility of developing technical and social
infrastructure, social  institutions, and agricultural education and extension
systems.
In the central planning system toward private agriculture, a specific
role has been assigned to  farm prices.  The prices for private  farmers had
different economic meaning from the firms and organization found on the input
and output sides of farm products.  For private  farms, prices received and
paid are  exogenous parameters affecting their resource use efficiency, supply
response, and incomes.  The prices, on the other hand, haven't played the same
role  for the state-owned and controlled firms producing farm inputs as well as
purchasing and processing farm output products.  The structure and the level
of production in the industries producing equipment and farm inputs have been
set by predetermined plans.  The development of the  industries in question has
been determined by the fact that the allocation of investment and means of
production to this sector is  a subject of decision under the central plan.
The prices had impacts upon neither economic performance nor profitability,
because profit was not a main goal to  achieve for the industries.  The  task
was to fulfill assigned planned targets.  In theory the achievement of this
task has  always been associated with the minimization of the cost of
production.  These industries  serving agriculture were operated within the
system which was characterized by considerable centralization of economic
decisions.  The function of the  system has based to  a large extent on the
instructions from the planning center and to  a lesser extent on the economic7
incentives for the enterprises to become more effective  in carrying out the
plans.3
The same can be said about the state-owned and cooperative organizations
purchasing products from the private  farms as well as about food processing
firms.  In the financial system where a certain percentage of profit is  added
to the purchase cost, these organizations were only interested in the purchase
of the planned amount of farm products.  There is  no real competition in the
farm output markets among the state buyers of farm products.
Under this system of regulation and implementation of centrally planned
targets, there was  no feedback from economic performance of private farming
sector to  its  economic partners which were the firms and organizations
operating in the supply and farm output market.  The linkage between the
latter and the private farming was established not through markets but through
the central planning.  Market didn't play an active regulative role  in
adjusting mutual performance of both parties.
Also, only indirectly through the central plan, the domestic farm markets
were linked to the world markets  for the agricultural and food products as
well as  to world markets for equipment and inputs  for farming.  Therefore, the
prices  in the world market had no  impacts on the level and structure of prices
on domestic farm market.  Likewise, domestic farm output and farm supply
prices had nothing to do with world prices in question.  Therefore, with the
existence of an administratively  regulated exchange rate, no one,  for
instance, was able  to calculate  the effectiveness  of farm exports.  All
parameters like prices used for this purpose were not objective because  they
were  administratively  created and not verified by markets.8
The market had not played an active role in controlling the economic
performance of private agriculture because prices were not derived from the
markets.  The market played almost no role  in price formation in the farm
supply market and relatively modest role  in the farm-output market.  In order
to move from this system to the system based on free market regulation in
agriculture, a considerable number of market institutions have to be
established.  Here it has  to be determined what should be marketed and what
must be regulated by the plan.  In the price system under central planning
there was no direct links among food prices,  farm product prices, and farm
input prices.  The extended system of subsidies and other fiscal regulation
was another source of further deterioration in this system.  Subsidies were to
fulfill social and political objectives under the central plan.
Since prices were subject to  administrative regulation, the lack of
equilibrium, especially in the supply market was observed.  The demand
exceeded supply because the control over demand for  input was very difficult
and unrealistic.  The industries producing farm inputs have been always
getting the remaining part of national investment.  So called "producer
market" or "seller market" was the permanent feature  in farm supply markets.
The production of many machines, equipment, and current inputs for farming
were highly monopolized.  Under these conditions, the high costs of production
of farm inputs were observed extensively.  To avoid high farm product prices
as a result of high prices of farm inputs,  the system of subsidies was
introduced.  This was supposed to help maintain the real  standard of living of
Polish population since food comprises almost 50 percent of consumers' total
expenditures.  However, this  subsidy became a  burden for the national economy.
· kk****9
As it  can be noticed, in the conditions described above, the impact of
central planning upon the production in the private sector of agriculture in
Poland had an indirect nature.  It could be called an indicative type of
planning.  To some extent, one might agree that  the process of implementation
of central plan's targets was similar  to the government intervention in market
economies.  The resemblance  is,  however, not big, since the government in the
market economies only intervene or correct  the impacts of prices and other
market parameters instead of replacing the whole system by the central plan.
Since private farming was independent in its  decision-making, the targets
of the central plan concerning the production in this sector should be
predictions rather than obligatory orders  to accomplish.  However, in practice
the Central Planner treated this part of the economy in the same way as  the
plan for the rest of economy ignoring existing differences between private
farms and state-owned firms.  The  targets of the plan like  the amount of
grain, meat, and other farm products  to purchase on the procurement state
prices were distributed and assigned among local administrators and
procurement organizations.  In order to meet the received planned targets,
these organizations attempted to  induce the farmer decision.  In practice,
this has often involved some direct administrative methods of enforcement like
the contracts associated with farmers' rights  to purchase scarce farm inputs
with better access  to some cheaper credits.
The role of central planning and the way the economy is  governed have
been changed during the economic reform implementation.  The biggest changes
have occurred in the non-agricultural part of the national economy.  Market
rule regulations  instead of instructions  from the economic center have been
introduced.  The direct government involvement in economy has been limited10
drastically.  This  is  true especially in  inter-firm financing rules  and firms'
decision-making.  The means of production and resources  are still owned by the
state and society  , but the firms are becoming more  free in choosing the way
of utilizing  these resources.  The process of privatization and attraction of
foreign capital  is also underway.
However,  the implementation of market oriented economic reform has not
changed the way the private farms are functioning, but it may change and
improve  the operating environment for this  sector of agriculture.
Particularly the change should be observed in farm price setting system.  Also
the organizations purchasing and processing farm products as well as  the
industrial enterprises producing farm inputs are becoming independent, self-
financing and self-governing.  The central plan targets are not anymore
obligatory (order type) tasks for them.  The same  is  true for farm banks.  All
these farm marketing companies,  industrial  firms producing farm inputs, banks,
and private farms, despite the differences of ownership status, are now
becoming independent agents in free market games.
The Polish economy is  approaching the  type of economy observed in
countries with market economies.  However, the process  of the transition is
not smooth.  For instance, the existence of disequilibria in the  farm supply
markets  like the shortage of different types of machinery, equipment, and
current farm inputs as well as the  insufficiently developed market
institutions  limit the speed of transition.4 The rapid implementation of free
market rules  and the introduction of free market prices for farm inputs create
dramatically high increment of prices.  The cost effect of this price hike  in
the private farming would be significant.  The  rise of production cost in
private farming sector would result in further inflation.  Private farming11
sector of agriculture is not, -in current conditions,  able to compensate the
cost-effect due to the  increase  in input prices by the improvement in
productivity growth.
The problem is that under the old system where each instruction from the
economic center was transmitted to the industries, the  firms producing  farm
inputs were not especially interested in cost-reduction performance.  Also  the
very limited import of the means of production for farming did not force the
industrial firms, mostly monopolistic enterprises, to produce at the lowest
possible cost.  There was no competitive environment for making any efforts to
improve productivity to  cut costs of production down.  Existence of expanded
system of subsidies made situation even worse.  It is not an easy task to
change  their long-time behavior.  Hence, the cost of production of farm inputs
is still high and what is more important, the supply of these  inputs is  still
short.  Under such circumstances,  the substitution of market system for the
centrally planned system doesn't necessarily mean less expensive and bigger
production of the  inputs  for the farming sector.  Market rules haven't yet
been founded well, so monopolistic industrial producers of farm inputs are
taking advantage of the existence of disequilibria by rising prices while not
increasing their production of these inputs.  The Central Planner, still  tries
to  keep control over the situation by introducing direct governmental
contracts and special order, tax deductions and subsidies.  Still the
domestic farm supply market is not directly linked with the world market
because of foreign debt.
The situation on the output side of farm market is different.  The
existence of almost 2.8 million private farms and several thousand socialized
farms creates the situation where features  of farm output market seem close  to12
the characteristics of "competitive market" in the market economy.  Since  the
demonopsonization of procurement organization is  now in progress, the
introduction of market rules here seems  to be  less difficult compared to  the
input side.  In summary, under conditions described above, the free market
principles are placed on a  hard test.  On the other hand, the central planning
is facing an even harder test after losing the strong direct controls  over
economic performance of private farming.
It is obvious  that the role of central planning in a national economy as
a  whole has to be changed while the economic reform is being implemented.  The
process of change in this respect is  now underway.  However, it will be
difficult to refer to a clearly defined concept of the  future role of central
plan in a market regulated economy in the socialist framework.  So  far  all
economic reforms have targeted to improve the methods of planning and the
methods of implementation in the real national economy.  There have been no
questions  asked about the role of the central plan in the regulation of
economic performance and the development of national economy.  The poor
performance of national economy and the failure to achieve central plan's
objectives have not been related to the central planning system itself.
The failure has been associated with the poor methodology in building the
central plan and the inefficient instruments for the  implementation of central
plan's objectives.  For the first time,  the issues  of the central planning
system with respect to the free market system have been put forward to public
and political discussion.  As far as  the national economy and the non-
agricultural sectors are concerned, the  issue is  how to combine  the central
planning with the free market system.  We do not, however, intend to  explore13
this problem.  Our focus is  on the future role of central plan in the private
sector of Polish agriculture.  Our intention is just to highlight some
important  issues for this  sector of the economy concerning the economic
reform.
The first suggestion is  related to  the new roles of central plan toward
the private farming.  It might be crucial to reduce and limit  the roles of
central plan in the regulation and control of economic performance of the
private farming.  The existence of independent farms and the relatively well-
developed farm markets,  especially output side,  impose almost immediately
limits on the prerogatives of the central planner in determining economic
parameters such as  farm prices.  Some different methods of state  intervention
which are similar  to those utilized in market economies need to be  introduced.
This might imply that the role of Annual Central Plan for the private
farming should be altered.  The Annual Central Plan for this  sector should be
nothing but predictions.  The plan should serve as a production outlook.  The
assessment of the current production and economic performance of private
agriculture should not be used as a base for the direct order decision which
used to give strong regulations on markets.  Only a few cases with the  large
discrepancy between the actual development of farming and the annual plan
prediction should call for the government intervention.  This intervention
should not be meant to be the substitution for the free market system or
should not limit the market's activities.
There has been some progress observed in expanding the roles  of the
market system in controlling economic performance of private  farming sector.
The process of moving from administratively regulated farm prices  to  the
prices based on supply-demand relationship  is underway.  This would lead to14
the more flexible and effective  allocation of resources and to  the better
adjustment in production composition in response to  the changes  in demand.
Considering the limited roles of central plan in agriculture, this means that
the central planner is  free from detail work which is associated with the
preparation of annual plan and its  implementation.  The central planner
instead can concentrate more on the preparation of long-term plans.
The central planner is not capable of foreseeing everything and cannot
play the same role as markets in the control of economic performance of
agriculture.  This  is not a question of precision of the planning methodology.
The necessity of detailed plans leads  to  the bureaucratic planning which
creates a number of distortions  in agriculture.
5 The continuous practice of
"perfecting the planning methods" had made bureaucrats believe that they were
playing an important role as pseudo-markets  in the control of economic
development and economic performance in agriculture as well as  in national
economy.  The work was time consuming and hard, but not  inevitable when
markets would have done  the job better.
As far as current performance and one year plans are  concerned, the
market  system should work well and can replace most of what was regulated by
the central plan.  This argument might require, however, a precise  definition
of annual central plan.  This  is  important in order not to  allow the expansion
of its definition by ambitious bureaucrats.  Otherwise, this would give room
to again transform the planning into a "hand driven" management of everything
at all levels  in agriculture.  In so-called "bureaucratic planning",  the focus
of bureaucrats' attention is on the control of the current economic
performance by creating economic parameters,  and by replacing the functions of
the market.  Updating annual outlooks and monitoring of economic and15
production performance should be the main activities of the central planner as
far as  the short-term plan is  concerned.
The central plan must concern itself with more long-run issues.6 The
activities of the central planner should involve the study of long-term
conditions of agricultural development and the identification of the
development projects which exceed the scope of the single enterprises.  The
central plan is  applicable and can be effective in the determination of the
long-term conditions of agricultural development.  The long-term plan includes
the investment allocation plan.  The prerogatives of the central plan in
investment allocation in agriculture should be limited only to  the large
investment projects for the improvement of technical infrastructure and to
the structural investment  in the  industries producing farm inputs.
In long-term planning the plans should also  include the formulation of
the basic targets of social welfare in agriculture.  A number of alternative
approaches,  in the framework of national economy, have to be  identified to
accomplish the planned targets.  The national plan is assumed to  form some
preferences over certain interest groups  in the national economy.7 In
particular, the  long-term central plan is assumed to constitute the base for
testing  the consistency of realization of individual  interests of different
lobbying groups with those of the society as a whole.  In this context,
agriculture in economic development should be a subject of long-term plans.ENDNOTES
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